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does not accompany every complex of similar verbal and visual images; whereas, notoriously, two people looking and speaking alike may be objects, respectively, of my sympathy and of my indifference.

The failure of this effort to show the unessential character of description in terms of self-psychology leads me to reaffirm the assertion that an adequate account of consciousness includes, with an analysis into structural elements, an account of the self as unique, persistent, and in relation to an environment personal and impersonal. The merely structural psychologist's treatment of emotion, thought, recognition, and the rest is indeed true so far as it goes, yet it goes but part way toward portraying the tumultuous chaos of the conscious life. And psychology is both defective and artificial so long as it undertakes observation, experiment, and scientific description in disregard of the basal fact of the science.

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DISCUSSION

TRUTH AND IDEAS

THE reader of this JOURNAL does not need to be told that truth is an ambiguous word. Nor is its uncertain use confined to philosophers; in popular speech almost as many meanings are assigned to it as in the discussions between pragmatists and intellectualists. Stop three men on the street and ask them "What is truth?" and you will get three different answers. The uncertainty, therefore, is not all of the philosopher's making. But while in popular speech such ambiguity is a matter of no great concern, it is little short of a positive disgrace to philosophy that a word of such importance and in such constant use should have no definite and commonly accepted meaning. It will, therefore, be the purpose of this paper to review the principal meanings given to this word and thus, if possible, to do something toward decreasing its ambiguity.

And to be as brief as possible, I shall say at once that there are three principal senses in which the word truth is commonly used; namely, (1) as a synonym for "reality," (2) as a synonym for "fact," and (3) as a quality or relation belonging to an "idea",—its "trueness."

The first of these uses is quite common in popular speech, and has always a tendency toward vagueness, rhetoric, and a capital T. Such a use of the word is certainly unfortunate both because of its haziness and because the word is badly needed elsewhere; and, con-

sidering the poverty of our language at this point, it would seem unwise to use up a good word like truth on something for which we already have another good word, namely, *reality*. For, of course, if "truth" is to mean everything, it will end by meaning nothing.

This criticism of the identification of truth with reality is, it seems to me, relevant not only to the popular use referred to, but also to the somewhat similar use found in the writings of technical philosophers like Mr. Bradley.[1] With him, indeed, truth is no longer a rhetorical catchword, and yet his treatment of it suffers from much the same vagueness found in popular speech. In fact, it would not be difficult to show that his view of truth as identical with reality involves the same sort of destructive dialectic which he maintains is inevitable for the "copy theory." "Truth is the whole universe realizing itself in one aspect" (p. 172). Truth and reality must be the same, for if there were any difference between them truth would fall short of reality and so fail to be true (p. 170). And yet "in passing over into reality" it ceases to be mere truth (p. 172). In short, in Mr. Bradley's own words, "truth at once is and is not reality" (p. 173). This kind of reasoning, so far from what Professor Dewey calls the concrete situation, is not very satisfactory or persuasive, and seems at times hardly more than logomachy. What it shows is that the term truth in this all-inclusive sense is not very useful as a philosophic tool. It would be much more productive of light if we should say reality when we mean it, and if, ceasing to repeat the rather unfruitful question "What is Truth?" we should ask ourselves instead what we mean by saying a thing is true.

The second general meaning applied to the word truth is much more clear-cut, definite, and justifiable. This is its identification with *known fact*. That twice two is four, that the earth revolves on its axis, that virtue is its own reward,—these we speak of as "truths." In like manner we speak of the various *truths* of science, or of the body of moral or religious truths. Or, going still farther, and combining all the general and important facts known to the race, we may speak of this whole as truth, or even, if you will, as Truth.

The criticisms brought against the first use of the word do not hold here, and this second meaning must be admitted to be quite justifiable. Yet some warning must be offered lest this second meaning for the term be confused with what I shall call its third meaning. It must be clearly understood, for instance, that the present controversy between pragmatists and intellectualists over "truth" has little or nothing to do with this kind of truth—truth, that is, as known fact. Failure to note this distinction has been the source of

[1] See especially his paper "On Truth and Copying," *Mind*, April, 1907.

a great deal of misapprehension on both sides.[2] The nature of *a* truth is only distantly relevant to the real issue—the question, namely, what is meant when a belief or idea is said to be true.

This brings us to our third meaning—the quality, namely, which a belief or opinion possesses which makes it "true" instead of "false." This description is, of course, as yet most indefinite and only tentative, but at least it differentiates truth from reality and from fact, and makes it a quality or relation which characterizes certain ideas, but not others. Just what this quality or relation may be, is, of course, the great question between pragmatism and intellectualism. And the controversy has brought to light three principal interpretations, three possible answers to the question, What is meant by saying a thing is true?

The first of these which I shall mention is the common view, or the intellectualist's view (as you like),—namely, that your thought is true if the object of your thought is as you think it. Whether this be the best explanation of the meaning of truth or not, I submit that it is at least clear, simple, and natural. Thus I believe my friend *B* is in Constantinople. If *B* really is in Constantinople, my thought is true. I confess it is impossible for me to see how anything could be simpler than this. To attempt to make a difficulty out of it or to torture it into some sort of mysterious, metaphysical, and crude "copy theory" seems to me a deliberate manufacture of absurd difficulties. At any rate, if this explanation of the meaning of "true" be not simple and clear, I despair of ever making anything clear to philosophers.[3]

The two other interpretations of the meaning of truth are those offered by pragmatism—for, as I shall try to show, pragmatists are not altogether at one on this question. And, first, let us consider what I shall call the position of radical pragmatism. It is with considerable reluctance that I attempt to outline this view of truth, for the pragmatist is exceedingly sensitive and is constantly crying out that he has been misrepresented and caricatured. For this reason I shall try, so far as possible, to describe his position in his own words, so that there can be no chance of misrepresentation. "Truth is an experienced relation of characteristic quality of things," says Professor Dewey, "and it has no meaning outside of such relation."[4]

[2] It may be due in part to this confusion between truth as fact and truth as a relation or quality that the pragmatist insists on the verifiability of all truth. "Unverifiable truths he can not regard as truths at all," says Mr. Schiller. Of course he can not if truth be taken to mean known fact. It is hard to see why it should be so if truth be a relation between idea and object, as Professor James says it is.

[3] *Cf.* also Dr. Ewer's article, "The Anti-realistic 'How?'" in this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., pp. 630–633.

[4] "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," *Mind*, July, 1906, p. 305.

As an example Professor Dewey cites an idea that a certain noise comes from a street-car; this idea being investigated and verified *becomes* true. Had it not been verified it never would have been true—even if as a fact the noise *had* really come from the car. To say that the idea was true before it was verified is, he insists, either tautologous (this "being just a restatement of the fact that the idea has, as a matter of fact, worked successfully"), or else, in any other sense, it is simply false.[5] Exactly speaking, the idea is not true till it works out, for its working and its truth are identical. "What the experimentalist means is that the effective working of the idea and its truth are one and the same thing—this working being neither the cause nor the evidence of truth, but its nature."[6] In like manner Professor James tells us: "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event, a process; the process, namely, of its verifying itself, its veri-*fication.* Its validity is the process of its valid-*ation.*"[7] In Mr. Schiller's terms, it is "a function of our intellectual activity, or a manipulation of our objects which turns out to be useful."[8] While some truths may be conceived of as "correspondences" or "agreements," this is only on condition "that these processes remain strictly *immanent* in *human* knowing." They are "valuable and serviceable cross-references which obtain *within* experience."[9] In short, "*true* means *valued by us.*"[10] "That which is accepted as real," says Professor Moore, "*i. e.*, as logically real, is one factor within the judging process, not something *outside* to which the whole judgment conforms."[11] In short, truth is a matter wholly of one's individual stream of consciousness. It is not a relation to something outside, it does not transcend the individual experience. It is itself just a particular kind of experience,—the experience, namely, of "effective working," of "being led up to" a more complete and satisfactory conscious state.

To justify my assertion that there are at present two quite different pragmatic positions on this subject, I must ask the reader to contrast the view just cited with the following, from one of Professor James's latest contributions to the subject: "Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one hand, and a reality outside of the idea, on the other. This relation, like all rela-

[5] "Reality and the Criterion for Truth of Ideas," *Mind*, July, 1907, pp. 335–337.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 337.

[7] "Pragmatism," p. 201.

[8] "Humanism," p. 61.

[9] "Mr. Bradley's Theory of Truth," *Mind*, July, 1907, p. 404.

[10] "Studies in Humanism," p. 195.

[11] This JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 571.

tions, has its *fundamentum,* namely, the matrix of experiential circumstance, psychological as well as physical, in which the correlated terms are found embedded. . . . What *constitutes the relation* known as truth, I now say, is just the *existence in the empirical world of this fundamentum* of circumstance surrounding object and idea and ready to be either short-circuited or traversed at full length. So long as it *exists* and a satisfactory passage through it between the object and the idea is *possible,* that idea both will *be* true and will *have been* true of that object, whether fully developed verification has taken place or not. The nature and place and affinities of the object, of course, play as vital a part in making the particular passage possible as do the nature and associative tendencies of the idea; so that the notion that truth could fall altogether inside of the thinker's experience and be something purely psychological, is absurd."[12] And in a still more recent article Professor James insists, with equal earnestness and in quite "intellectualistic" vein, that the object of the idea must really be "there," and that if this be not the case neither subjective "satisfactions" nor "utility" and "successful working" can make the idea true. Satisfactions are "insufficient unless reality be also incidentally led to. If the reality he [the pragmatist] assumed were cancelled from his universe of discourse, he would straightway give the name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their satisfactoriness. For him, as for the critic, there can be no truth unless there be something to be true about. Ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some mirrored matter gives them cognitive luster." And in speaking of useful ideas he says, "That these ideas should be true *in advance of and apart from* their utility, that, in other words, their objects should be really there, is the very condition of their having that kind of utility."[13]

I trust I shall be pardoned for these long citations, for they express very much more clearly than I could have done the less radical pragmatic view. It is to be noted that according to this view the truth of an idea is not to be identified with the process of its proof nor with any psychological process whatever, and that it is not to be found within any single finite experience, but transcends, or may transcend, every such experience. It is not "the effective working of the idea," but the relation between an idea and a reality "beyond the direct experience of the particular cognizer,"[14] a relation founded in the *fundamentum* or sum total of all relevant facts, physical as

[12] *Ibid.,* pp. 465, 466.

[13] "The Pragmatic Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders," *Philosophical Review,* Vol. XVII., pp. 8, 13.

[14] Professor James in this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 403, note.

well as psychical, and *constituted* by the *existence* of these facts. *It is the truth of the idea that makes it useful; not its usefulness that makes it true.* Since the notion that truth could fall altogether within the thinker's experience is "absurd," it is hardly to be identified with the process of verification or with any other "function of our intellectual activity" which obtains "within our experience." In short, according to this latest pragmatic view, truth is a present condition, not an event which "happens to an idea," and is no more psychical than physical in its nature. It is a relation which, apparently, no one short of a Royce an absolute need ever experience.

So far all seems plain enough. And yet I must confess I am not fully clear as to this new pragmatic position. The long quotation cited above from Professor James would seem to leave but little difference between his view and that of the intellectualist. But Professor James would insist that there is a difference and a great one. His truth, it seems, is "ambulatory" and concrete, while that of the intellectualist is "saltatory" and abstract. "Sensible qualities," he admits, "are not true realities, but only their appearances"; these true realities to which our ideas often refer never get within our immediate experience; but the true idea "brings us at least so far, puts us in touch with reality's most authentic substitutes and representatives." They lead us as near to the real object which we mean as we can ever get; and there, of course, they stop. The pity is that Professor James's explanation stops there too, and hence fails to touch upon the most important part of the question—the relation, namely, between these last terms within our experience and the outer objects of which these experiences of ours are only "substitutes and representatives."

If the chief aim of this paper were controversial I should like to ask whether the truth relation which Professor James says obtains "between an idea and a reality outside of the idea" is an ambulatory or a saltatory relation. If it be ambulatory, how is it we can never ambulate directly to the "true realities," but only to their "substitutes and representatives"? If, on the other hand, this truth relation be saltatory, in what does Professor James's view differ from that of the intellectualist?

Nor do I feel much clearer on these questions after a careful perusal of Professor James's latest attempt (in the *Philosophical Review* for January) to put an end to all misunderstandings. He complains in this article, rather bitterly, of the blindness of his "misunderstanders"; but I think the passages just cited from him and other pragmatists will in part explain our obtuseness. We are told, on the one hand, that felt satisfactions are indispensable to truth, and that truth consists in the concrete "links of experience

sequent upon an idea, which mediate between it and a reality"; and, on the other hand, we are assured that ideas may "be true in advance of and apart from their utility," provided their objects are "really there," quite independently, therefore, of any satisfactions. And in an earlier article, already cited, we learn that truth may consist not in the actual concrete process of verification, but in the conditions that make verification merely *possible,* and that "the idea will both *be* true and will *have been* true of that object whether fully developed verification has taken place or not." Now if the idea may be true prior to any one's satisfaction and prior to the concrete links of experience sequent upon it, how can it be said that the satisfactions and the concrete links are "indispensable" to truth? On the other hand, if they are indispensable, how can the idea have been true in advance of them? In short, are satisfactions indispensable or are they not? Does the truth of an idea consist in the concrete process of its verification, or in the condition of correspondence that makes such a process possible prior to its verification and to the resulting satisfactions? If, on the one hand, satisfactions are indispensable and truth is the process of actual verification, or is at least dependent upon it and therefore impossible prior to it, then, of course, it follows that the fact that the object of the idea is really there does not make the idea true. Thus John's idea that Peter has a toothache would not be true until John is satisfied, even if, as a fact, Peter actually has a toothache, and although at the same time it *is* true to Paul who is satisfied. In like manner pragmatism will be true only if it satisfies us, and hence it may be both true and not true at the same time and in the same sense to different people. if, on the other hand, satisfactions are *not* indispensable, if truth is merely the condition which makes verification possible, and if a belief may be genuinely true before it is verified and without any one's feeling satisfaction, then it is hard to see that pragmatism has contributed anything in the least original or new to the conception of the truth relation. Will the pragmatists tell us plainly which of these two contradictory views is orthodox pragmatism? For those of us who are still bound by the shackles of a "static," intellectualistic logic are unable to accept them both at the same time, owing to our possibly superstitious reverence for the principle of contradiction. It may be that if we were pragmatists we should have no such scruples; but on this I dare not venture an opinion.

However this may be, I suppose the pragmatist will insist at any rate that the idea gets its truth not from its "correspondence," but from the fact that it is "an instrument for enabling us the better to have to do with the object and to

act about it."[15] And this suggests an ambiguity in the word *idea* which in my opinion is responsible for a great deal of the misunderstanding between pragmatists and intellectualists. In his discussions of truth the pragmatist uses the word "idea" to mean any representative content that leads to action or helps bring order into a given situation. Hence Professor Dewey's synonym for it—namely, "plan of action." Now it is obviously almost inevitable that if the term *truth* is to be applied to "ideas" of this sort, it can not retain the meaning given it by the intellectualist, as defined above.[16] As a "plan of action" is not an assertion about something outside our experience, but a way of grouping our data or guiding our conduct, its "truth," of course, can not be said to depend upon its correspondence with any outer reality. One might, indeed, wonder that the word truth should be applied to it at all, but once so applied it is evident that there is nothing for it to mean but usefulness and successful action. A true idea in this sense is, therefore, one that works. This is especially manifest in the case of the "laws" of science, and I believe it was in this connection that the pragmatic identification of truth with usefulness arose. In so far as a scientific law is a mere shorthand expression for our experience, a mere formula for the condensed description of our perceptions, its truth may be said to consist in its working. The Copernican theory describes a greater number of phenomena and enables us to handle them more easily than does the Ptolemaic, and hence is considered "truer,"—that is, better for our purposes. Or take Professor Dewey's example of the invention of the telephone. Here was a "plan of action" that worked itself out and proved itself "true." In short, if an "idea" proves itself a useful tool it is called true, and thus truth comes to be regarded as merely "a form of the good." And it must be admitted that if the word *true* is to be applied to inventions and similar plans at all, then their "truth" is indeed "wholly an affair of making them true."

The intellectualist, however, would not be willing to admit that the predicates *true* and *false* can be rightfully applied to plans of action or inventions at all. When he says an "idea" is true he uses the word in quite a different sense—namely, as meaning a *judgment*. To him an idea which is not a judgment, but is a mere image, or plan, or formula, may lead in what direction it likes, it may be useful, successful, satisfactory, or their opposites, it may have any function you will, but it is not in the category of things that can be either

[15] This JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 398.—I *suppose* Professor James would make the reply suggested, though I confess I can not see how such an assertion would be consistent with the admission that truth is a relation.

[16] See p. 124 of this paper.

true or false. In Bosanquet's words, "Truth and falsehood are coextensive with judgment."[17] This being the case, the intellectualist does not and can not consider "true" a predicate of the same kind as "benevolent," or "luminous," or "good," nor can he identify truth with a "function," or "leading," or "process." The usefulness of a plan of action depends, of course, upon its being used. A judgment, on the other hand, may be useful and good, but that is not what makes it true. A judgment is one thing; a plan of action quite another. It is no wonder, then, that using the word "idea" in such radically different senses, the intellectualist and the pragmatist should often misunderstand each other and fight as those who beat the air.

The distinction I have just pointed out seems to be quite overlooked by thinkers of various and radically different schools, for example, by Professor Dewey, on the one hand, and Professor Royce, on the other.[18] These writers often deal with the subject of truth as if there were no difference between judgment and purpose. To attempt in this way to make purpose and activity absorb everything else seems to me most unfortunate for clear thinking. Take, for instance, such a judgment as that referred to a few pages back—"My friend *B* is in Constantinople"—or John's judgment "Peter has a toothache." How can it be said that here "the agreement, correspondence, is between purpose, plan, and its own execution, fulfillment"?[19] Where is the plan, and where the fulfillment? Or take at random any judgment from Professor Dewey's writings—as this: "Reality as such is an entire situation." How can this—at least without much forced and unnatural interpretation—be called a *plan of action?* Or look at it from the other point of view. Granted that if the term truth is to be applied to a plan or purpose at all it may as well mean successful execution as anything else, is not the use of the word in this connection, to say the least, unnatural and unnecessarily confusing? An invention may be useful and may work and be successful, my plan to go down town[20] may be wise and

[17] "Logic," Vol. I., p. 72.

[18] Professor Moore has conclusively shown that if "idea" be taken to mean purpose, as Royce insists it shall, then the "truth" of an idea must be the fulfillment of the purpose within our experience, and not (as Royce says) the "correspondence between our ideas and their objects." To reach any relation between idea and a reality outside of one's private stream of consciousness Royce has practically to give up the purposive function of ideas as their most essential characteristic, and to speak of them as *representative.* See "The World and the Individual," Chaps. 1, 7, and 8, and Moore's "Some Logical Aspects of Purpose," in "Studies in Logical Theory," pp. 341–382.

[19] Professor Dewey, in "The Control of Ideas by Facts," this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 202.

[20] See Mr. Sellars's admirable discussion in this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 435.

bring good results, but to call either of them *true* would seem to be a step toward the invention of a new language.

The aim of this paper has been chiefly to clear up the meaning of certain important terms constantly used in the controversy over truth, rather than to take up the cudgels (except incidentally) for either side. Before closing, however, I wish to point out one fact which is not altogether one of terminology. While it is every one's privilege to define his own terms in his own way, provided he uses them consistently, it is also incumbent upon us all to recognize every genuine and relevant fact or relation, no matter by what name we call it. And now I should like to put the following dilemma. Either there is a real and relevant world outside of your private stream of consciousness—it may be a material world or one made up of other selves—or else there is no such world and you need reckon only with your own private experiences. If you admit that this outer world exists and that you judge about the things or persons in it, you must also admit that the relation between these things or persons and your judgments of them is a fact which deserves to be recognized, and that, in one sense at least, the validity of your judgments depends on this relation. You may call this relation truth or reserve the term truth for something else, as you like; but, aside from terminology, once you recognize this relation and its bearing upon your judgments, you have essentially accepted the intellectualist's position. On the other hand, deny the existence of this relation and its relevancy to your judgments, and you either deny that there is any world outside your own conscious experience or else you affirm that if such a world there be it is nothing and never can be anything to you. And when you have done this, how far are you from solipsism? The intellectualist might be willing to admit that if this be a solipsistic world "truth" might as well mean "effective working" as anything else.[21] But if it be a world in which one makes genuine references to outer realities that never come within his private stream of consciousness, then the relation between those realities and one's judgments about them (a relation which from the nature of the case one can never experience) is something which can not be neglected, but must be reckoned with, call it what you will.

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[21] It is interesting to note in this connection that all Professor Dewey's and Professor Moore's contributions to "Studies in Logical Theory," as well as most of Professor Dewey's more recent papers on truth and knowledge, could perfectly well have been written from the standpoint of solipsism—and, in fact, it is difficult to see how some of them could have been written from any other.